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DOMESTIC RELATIONS - ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT DEFINES
MARITAL PROPERTY TO INCLUDE FUTURE PENSION BENEFITS. Day v.
Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).
In 1981 Mrs. Day filed suit for divorce from her husband of
twenty-nine years, Dr. Day. The divorce was contested only as to mari-
tal property.' Dr. Day had been employed by the University of Arkan-
sas since 19612 and during that time Dr. Day made monthly contribu-
tions to the University's pension plan.3 His interest in the pension plan
could not be diminished by the University and was not made contingent
upon his continued employment. However, Dr. Day was not allowed to
withdraw the funds standing to his credit and also could not transfer
his interest in the plan.
The Washington County Chancery Court found Dr. Day's interest
in the University's pension plan to be marital property.4 Dr. Day ap-
pealed the chancery court's decision and argued that the pension plan
was separate property and immune from Mrs. Day's claim. The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's decision and held that Dr.
Day's interest in the pension plan was marital property which was sub-
ject to allocation between the parties.5 Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663
S.W. 2d. 719 (1984).
I. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983) defines marital property as all property acquired
by either spouse subsequent to the marriage with exceptions which are not at issue in this case.
The statute also provides that upon entry of a divorce decree, each spouse is entitled to the prop-
erty he or she owned prior to marriage and one-half of all marital property. The court retains the
discretion to make some other division of marital property if an equal division is found to be
inequitable.
2. Dr. Day had been employed by the University of Arkansas since 1961, first as a physics
professor and later as an associate dean.
3. Dr. Day made monthly contributions to the plan at the rate of ten percent of his salary.
The University matched his contributions. At the time of the trial the total contributions by and
for Dr. Day totaled $62,498.10. The accumulated value of his interest in the plan was $95,425.03.
The plan is a combination of fixed and variable annuities which cannot be paid in a lump sum,
have no loan value and cannot be transferred. Dr. Day could, however, stop making contributions
at any time and begin receiving his annuities.
4. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983) and supra note I for definition of marital
property. The chancellor awarded half of the $95,425.03 in benefits to Mrs. Day. Under the de-
cree, only when Dr. Day elects to begin receiving the annuities will Mrs. Day receive her benefits
upon the half interest awarded to her. Any contributions made after the date of decree will accrue
only to Dr. Day's benefit.
5. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983) and supra note I for the proper division of
marital property.
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The well-established American practice of granting alimony and
dividing property upon divorce stems from the English ecclesiastical
law as it existed before the reform of the English court system in
1857.6 In England the ecclesiastical courts did not grant absolute di-
vorces as are granted in the United States, but instead granted only
divorces a mensa et thoro.7 The alimony awarded under these circum-
stances merely constituted a recognition and enforcement of the hus-
band's duty to support his wife, which continued after judicial separa-
tion.8 The ecclesiastical courts formulated several reasons in attempting
to explain why a continuing duty to support was placed on the hus-
band, while no reciprocal duty to support was placed on the wife., One
reason was the fact that the ecclesiastical courts gave the husband ex-
clusive control over his wife's property."0 Alimony was further made
necessary by the lack of employment opportunities for women during
the nineteenth century." Additionally, the ecclesiastical courts consid-
ered the degree of the husband's fault when making the award of ali-
mony or property12 and held that where the wife was the guilty party in
the marriage breakup she was not entitled to alimony. 13 Thus, even in
English law, awards made upon divorce were not measured solely by
the wife's need for support.
During the late 1800's many American states enacted statutes,
based on decisions by the English ecclesiastical courts, which made
property and alimony awards only to the wife. 4 Many authorities ques-
tioned the adoption of the English view by the states because the courts
in America granted absolute divorces, which terminated the relation-
ship of husband and wife, while English courts granted divorces a
mensa et thoro, which did not free the husband and wife from the
bonds of matrimony.' 5 The authorities reasoned that the theory which
6. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS §14.1 (1968).
7. H. CLARK, supra note 6. This type of divorce authorized the husband and wife to live
apart, but did not set them free from the bonds of marriage.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The ecclesiastical courts commonly remedied this problem by taking into account the
value of the property the wife took into the marriage when awarding alimony to the wife. See
Smith v. Smith, 2 Phill. Ecc. 235, 161 Eng. Rep. 1130 (1814); Cooke v. Cooke, 2 Phill. Ecc. 40,
161 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1812).
I1. H. CLARK, supra note 6.
12. Id. See, Otway v. Otway, 2 Phill. Ecc. 109, 116 Eng. Rep. 1092 (1813).
13. Vernier and Hurlbutt, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Stat-
utory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROnS. 197, 198 (1939).
14. Id. at 201. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §139 (1937); MINN. STAT. ANN. §518.55 (West
1969); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §419 (1975).
15. See supra, notes 6 and 13.
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supported the English view of alimony could not apply to the absolute
divorces granted by American courts because the husband's duty to
support his wife terminated with the marriage." Nevertheless, Ameri-
can courts have continued to award alimony. In the opinion of some
judges, alimony merely continues the support which the wife was enti-
tled to receive while the marriage existed. 17 Other courts look on ali-
mony as furnishing damages for the husband's wrongful breach of the
marriage contract.1 8 Still others speak of it as a penalty imposed on the
guilty husband.' 9
The Arkansas Legislature, in 1891, enacted section 34-1214 of the
Arkansas Statutes Annotated.20 This statute, deeply rooted in the law
of the English courts, provided that a wife who is granted a divorce
shall be entitled to one-third ('A) of her husband's personal property
absolutely and one-third ('/3) of her husband's real property for life.21
In addition, the wife was entitled to the property only as long as she
was not the guilty party in the divorce.22
Decisions by the Arkansas Supreme Court are illustrative of how
the statutory provision which granted the wife a one-third (/3) interest
in her husband's personal property was interpreted. In Beene v.
Beene,2 a a trial court had granted the wife one-third of the remainder
of her husband's personal property after deductions for the husband's
debts had been made.2 4 The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, stating
that Mrs. Beene was entitled to one-third of the personal property ab-
solutely, without taking the husband's indebtedness into consid-
eration.25
In another case, Reed v. Reed,2 6 the court determined that a hus-
band's interest in a partnership was personal property. As in Beene, the
court stressed the fact that Mrs. Reed was entitled to one-third of her
husband's personal property absolutely and that this would include one-
16. See supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. See Driskill v. Driskill, 181 S.W.2d 1001 (Mo. App. 1944).
19. See Lewis v. Lewis, 202 Ark. 740, 151 S.W.2d 998 (1941).
20. 1891 Ark. Acts 27, later codified as ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-1214, provided that a wife
who was granted a divorce would be entitled to one-third ('1) of her husband's personal property
absolutely and one-third ('/) life estate in all lands in which her husband was seized of an estate
of inheritance at any time during their marriage.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 64 Ark. 518, 43 S.W. 968 (1898).
24. Id. at 521, 43 S.W. at 969.
25. Id. at 522, 43 S.W. at 969.
26. 223 Ark. 292, 265 S.W.2d 531 (1954).
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third of any interest that Mr. Reed might have in a partnership. 7 Also,
in Mickle v. Mickle," the court held that "personal property," under
section 34-1214,9 included shares of stock purchased by Mr. Mickle
during his marriage to Mrs. Mickle.3 0 The court awarded Mrs. Mickle
a one-third absolute interest in all shares of stock purchased by her
husband during the marriage. 1
The first case in Arkansas to indirectly touch on the question of
whether pension benefits were personal property which could be divided
upon divorce was Stone v. Stone. 2 In that case the husband's guardian
had been receiving payments from the husband's United States Gov-
ernment pension and had been putting the payments in a bank account.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to
award Mrs. Stone one-third interest in the bank account as a share of
her husband's personal property.33 The court reasoned that this was a
specific partition of property owned by the parties during coverture and
that the wife took her share as a mandate of the law.34
After Stone, it was over forty years before another decision con-
cerning the issue of whether pension benefits were personal property
was handed down. The first such decision was Fenney v. Fenney,31 in
which the court held that Mrs. Fenney was not entitled to one-third of
her husband's Air Force pension. The court concluded that since the
right to the pension, not yet due and payable, could not be assigned,
sold, transferred, or conveyed, it could not be considered personal prop-
erty within the meaning of section 34-1214.16
In another decision involving pension benefits, Knopf v. Knopf,
37
the court held that Mr. Knopf's railroad pension was not subject to
27. Id. at 294, 265 S.W.2d at 532.
28. 253 Ark. 663, 488 S.W.2d 45 (1972).
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-1214 (Supp. 1983).
30. 253 Ark. at 665, 488 S.W.2d at 47.
31. Id.
32. 188 Ark. 622, 67 S.W.2d 189 (1934).
33, Id. The court awarded Mrs. Stone $400 of the $1200 that was in the bank account. It
should be noted that the court did not reach the issue of whether Mrs. Stone had an interest in
future payments under the pension.
34. 188 Ark. at 624, 67 S.W.2d at 190.
35. 259 Ark. 858, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976).
36. Id. See also Lowery v. Lowery, 260 Ark. 128, 538 S.W.2d 36 (1976). In Lowery the
court cited Fenney and gave the same reasons for refusing to award Mrs. Lowery a one-third
interest in her former husband's pending Jones Act claim. The Jones Act, codified at 46 U.S.C.
§688 (1984), provides that a seaman injured in the course of his employment by the negligence of
the owner, master, or fellow crew members can recover damages for his injuries from his
employer.
37. 264 Ark. 946, 576 S.W.2d 193 (1979).
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division upon divorce, since the pension benefits were not presently
available to Mr. Knopf and would not be available to him until he
reached age sixty-five or until an occupational disability occurred. Once
again, the court reasoned that, under section 34-1214, benefits which
could not be assigned or conveyed should not be treated as personal
property.38
At the time of the Arkansas Supreme Court decisions in Fenney
and Knopf, courts in other jurisdictions were beginning to recognize
pensions as property which was subject to division upon divorce. Cali-
fornia, a community property state, overruled a thirty-five year prece-
dent39 in In re Marriage of Brown40 and concluded that future pension
benefits represent a property interest, and to the extent that such rights
derive from employment during coverture, they comprise a community
asset subject to division upon divorce. The earlier California decision
had refused to recognize a pension payable in the future as community
property because such pensions were contingent upon continued em-
ployment.4' The court in Brown refused to accept this view, stating that
when community funds or efforts are expended to acquire a conditional
right to future income, the future income should be treated as a com-
munity asset.
4 2
Several common-law jurisdictions also allowed future pension ben-
efits to be included in property settlements between divorced couples.43
In In re Marriage of Pope,44 the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a
public employee pension plan could be regarded as property of Mr. and
Mrs. Pope's marriage. The court reached this decision by determining
that Mr. Pope's pension plan was an asset of the marriage because it
was created by deductions from Mr. Pope's salary which would have
otherwise been available to the parties during their marriage.45 The
court then stated that the pension could be divided between husband
and wife upon divorce because the pension was not subject to forfeiture
38. Id. at 948, 576 S.W.2d at 194.
39. French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941). This case held that non-vested
pension benefits are not property, but are mere expectancies and thus not a community asset
subject to division upon dissolution of marriage.
40. 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561 (1976). See also Everson v. Everson, 24 Ariz. App. 239,
537 P.2d 624 (1975) (since pension plans were a mode of employee compensation, that portion of
the plan earned during coverture should be regarded as marital property).
41. French, 17 Cal.2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
42. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 566.
43. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pope, 544 P.2d 639 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); In re Marriage of
Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App. 1975).




in any manner. 46
In 1979 the Arkansas General Assembly enacted Act 705, later
codified in section 34-1214 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated. 7 The
major purpose of this statute was to forestall an equal protection chal-
lenge to the property division law which was enacted in 1891.48 The
statute amended portions of the 1891 statute which only allowed bene-
fits to wives, and distributed property upon divorce without distinguish-
ing between the husband and wife. 9 In addition to remedying the
equal protection flaws, the new statute drastically changed the method
of property division upon divorce. Section 34-1214 now provides that
upon entry of a divorce decree, each spouse is entitled to the property
which he or she owned prior to marriage and each spouse is entitled to
one-half of all marital property.50
Initially, the new concept of marital property had little effect on
the outcome of divorce cases involving pension benefits. In Paulsen v.
Paulsen,1 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a military retirement
pension does not come within the scope of section 34-1214 and should
not be divided equally as marital property. The court relied heavily on
Fenney" and said that retirement pay is not a fixed asset which is sub-
ject to division upon divorce. 53 The court also reasoned that the legisla-
tive purpose in enacting section 34-1214 was to eliminate gender-based
statutes and to remove the distinction between real and personal prop-
erty, but was not to define marital property any more broadly than
prior law, which had refused to include a spouse's pension within the
definition of marital property.1
4
In Day v. Day,55 the Arkansas Supreme Court realized that it had
been failing to recognize the new concept of "marital property" created
by section 34-1214. The court stated that the statute defines marital
46. Id.
47. ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-1214 (Supp. 1983). This statute provides for an equal division of
all "marital property" between husband and wife. Marital property is defined as all property
acquired subsequent to marriage.
48. Third Annual Survey of Arkansas Law, 3 UALR L.J. 235, 236 (1980).
49. Id.
50. The term "marital property" is defined as all property acquired subsequent to marriage,
with exceptions which are not important in this case.
51. 269 Ark. 523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980). See also Hackett v. Hackett, 278 Ark. 82, 643
S.W.2d 56 (1982) (wife not entitled to any portion of her husband's employee capital account
upon divorce); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 267 Ark. 595, 593 S.W.2d 21 (1980) (pension benefits which
are vested but not currently due and payable not personal property).
52. 259 Ark. 858, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976).
53. Paulsen, 269 Ark. at 525, 601 S.W.2d at 874.
54. Id.
55. 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).
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property as all property acquired by either spouse after marriage and,
additionally, that the statute directs all marital property to be distrib-
uted to each spouse equally.56
The court in Day stated that the clear purpose of section 34-1214
is to insure that all spouses are treated equally when property is allo-
cated in a divorce settlement.57 The court reasoned that if a distinction
is drawn between amounts of money which are currently payable and
amounts of money contained in a pension which are vested but payable
in the future, the purpose of the statute would be frustrated.58 For in-
stance, if Dr. Day had deposited ten percent of his salary in a savings
account each pay period for the last twenty years the money would
have undoubtedly been included as "marital property." The court
stated that the result should be the same when Dr. Day used part of
the family's money to purchase pension benefits which are payable in
the future. 59 The court concluded that to hold otherwise would deprive
Mrs. Day of the equal treatment mandated by section 34-1214 and the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 0
After examining section 34-1214, the court further supported its
decision by turning to the leading case in this area, In re Marriage of
Brown.61 In Brown, the California court reasoned that when pension
benefits, vested or nonvested, derived from employment during cover-
ture, they comprise a community asset subject to division in a property
settlement proceeding. 2 Although the Arkansas court relied heavily on
Brown, it should be pointed out that Brown applied to both vested and
nonvested pension benefits.6" The Arkansas court clearly noted that Dr.
Day's benefits were vested and the court's decision seems to be limited
to this situation."
The court also said that the chancellor was correct in deferring
Mrs. Day's realization of income from her one-half interest in the plan
until Dr. Day elects to begin receiving the annuities. The court deter-
mined that it was better to defer Mrs. Day's realization than to try to
56. Id. at 265, 663 S.W.2d at 721.
57. Id.
58. Id. In addition, the court stated that the statute was mandated by recent United States
Supreme Court decisions which state that spouses must be treated equally.
59. Id. at 265, 663 S.W.2d at 721.
60. Id.
61. 15 Cal.3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 281 Ark. at 268, 663 S.W.2d at 722.
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estimate the present value of her benefits under the pension plan. 5
In conclusion, the Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned that earnings
or other property acquired by each spouse must be treated as marital
property, as defined by section 34-1214. Also, neither spouse can de-
prive the other of any interest in marital property by putting it tempo-
rarily beyond his or her control, as by a purchase of annuities or by
participation in a retirement pension plan."6
The dissent, written by Justice Hickman, argued that the pension
should not be regarded as marital property simply because Dr. Day
contributed a small percentage of his pay check to the pension.67 The
fact still remained that Dr. Day's pension had no cash value, no loan
value, and it could not be transferred or assigned. 8 The dissent stated
that the majority decision would create an inequitable situation; for ex-
ample, it might be extended to insurance benefits with no cash or loan
value simply because the insurance was paid for with funds acquired
during the marriage. The dissent asserted that such assets should not
be treated as marital property, but instead any inequity in a settlement
of marital property should be offset by an award of alimony.69
The Arkansas Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the holding in
Day. In Gentry v. Gentry,70 the wife claimed an interest in her hus-
band's civil service pension. The contributions to the plan were made
while the couple was married and the husband was drawing pension
benefits when the divorce action was filed. The court concluded that the
civil service pension was marital property and in doing so the court
relied heavily on Day.71 In both of these cases the court firmly stated
that vested pension benefits should be included within the definition of
marital property. The court defined vested to mean that the pension
could not be diminished by the employer and was not contingent upon
the employee's continued employment. Therefore, it appears that the
courts will strive to achieve an equal division of property and in so
doing they will regard a pension, which is vested, as marital property.
The decisions in Day and Gentry should have a significant impact
on the practice of family law in Arkansas, one reason being that a pen-
sion may be the largest, and quite often the only substantial asset of a
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 269, 663 S.W.2d at 723.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 282 Ark. 413, 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984). See also Deaton v. Deaton, II Ark. Ct. App. 165,
668 S.W.2d 49 (1984) (employee retirement fund was marital property).
71. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413, 668 S.W.2d 947.
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marriage. This means that many couples who once would have been
regarded as having very little property will now have an asset which
must be given proper recognition in property settlement. These cases
are also significant because they signify another advance by Arkansas
courts toward equalizing the division of property upon divorce, as man-
dated by the United States Supreme Court. "
In the past, courts have taken a narrow view as to what fits the
definition of marital property. One reason for this may have been that
some types of property are hard to value accurately. Thus, Day 3 is
significant because it implies that courts in Arkansas will no longer be
allowed to exclude future benefits from marital property on the grounds
that the benefits are too uncertain to value.
The decision in Day gave little attention to the proper method of
valuation when dividing pension benefits. Most authorities agree that
there are two basic methods for valuing and dividing pension benefits:
1) present cash value method and 2) fractional share method.7 ' Under
the present cash value method, a lump sum value is placed on the pen-
sion and awarded to the employee spouse. Meanwhile, other marital
property of equal value is given to the other spouse.7 5 The obvious
problem under this plan is obtaining a proper appraisal of the value of
the pension. For instance, a young, recently divorced husband may die
soon after he pays his ex-wife through the property settlement
thousands of dollars for a marital interest in a pension that evaporates
at his death and from which he never benefits. However, many courts
have found that uncertainties in determining present value are out-
weighed by the fact that the division of property is promptly settled
and is not unduly extended until pension benefits become payable to
the employee.76
The other commonly used method is the fractional share method.
Under this method, pension rights are determined upon dissolution of
the marriage, but no money or assets change hands until the pension
benefits are paid. The major problem with this method is making an
accurate apportionment of marital and separate interests under the
72. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama's statutory scheme imposing alimony
obligations on husbands but not wives violates equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.)
73. In Day, Mrs. Day was awarded one-half ( ) interest in the plan, but realization of in-
come from the plan was deferred until Dr. Day begins receiving benefits from the plan.
74. W. REPPY, JR. & C. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 299-301
(1983).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 300.
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pension plan." The courts have tried to avoid this problem by appor-
tioning the benefits based on a ratio of the time of marriage during
which these pension benefits were earned to the total years of service
during which the pension was earned. This ratio is then applied against
the amount of pension income to be received. The non-employee spouse
then receives one-half of this amount unless the court deems it inequi-
table.7 8 For example, if an employee works fifty months before mar-
riage and one hundred months during marriage, quitting when the
marriage ends, the marital property part of the pension will be two-
thirds (100/150). The non-employee spouse would then probably re-
ceive one-half of this amount.
The court in Day has taken a giant step toward equalizing the
division of property between the spouses in a divorce action. This deci-
sion touches a substantial marital asset, and should have a significant
impact on the family law practice in Arkansas, even though the proper
method of valuation is still in doubt.
Roger Morgan
77. Id.
78. Rennick, Apportionment of Community Property Interests in Prospective Military Re-
tirement Benefits upon Divorce, 9 ST. MARY'S L. J. 72 (1977).
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